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THE DIFFERENT WORLDS OF LABOUR AND COMPANY LAW: TRUTH OR 
MYTH? 
MM Botha 
1 General 
The shareholder-stakeholder debate took central stage as early as in the 1930s in 
the United States of America with different viewpoints discernible from 
commentators like Dodd and Berle. The issue debated was whether the interests of 
other stakeholders should be addressed in corporate law or whether shareholder 
primacy and the maximisation of their wealth should be the only issue.1 Multiple 
theories and models on the nature of the company and corporate governance 
stemmed from these different schools of thought. The shareholder-stakeholder issue 
is still often debated in South Africa and cannot be viewed as settled. Developments 
in corporate governance jurisprudence in South Africa, also including stakeholders 
other than shareholders, have been witnessed to by the publication of the various 
King Reports,2 which paved the way to the highly anticipated Companies Act.3 
The development of corporate law and corporate governance jurisprudence paved 
the way for the recognition of multiple stakeholders of a company with only one 
shareholder, but the full recognition of employees as stakeholders in a company is 
still a matter for debate in South Africa. In 1980, British law, for example, was 
changed to require that directors have regard "to the interests of the company's 
employees in general, as well as the interests of its members".4 
                                        
  Monray Marsellus Botha. BLC LLB LLM BCom (Hons) (UP), MCom (UJ), Advanced Diploma in 
Insolvency and Practice (AIPSA) (UP), Advanced Diploma in Corporate Law (UJ), Advanced 
Diploma in Alternative Dispute Resolution (AFSA/UP). Senior lecturer, Faculty of Law, North-West 
University (Potchefstroom Campus). E-mail: monray.botha @nwu.ac.za. 
1 Berle 1932 Harv L Rev 1365-1372 and Dodd 1931-1932 Harv L Rev 1145-1163 for the respective 
viewpoints on the shareholder-stakeholder debate. 
2 The King Report on Corporate Governance 1994 (Institute of Directors King Report I), King 
Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa in 2002 (Institute of Directors King Report II) 
and King Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa in 2009 (Institute of Directors King 
Report III). 
3 Companies Act 71 of 2008 (the Companies Act). The Companies Act became operational on 1 
May 2011. 
4 Wedderburn 1993 ILJ (UK) 527. 
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Unfortunately the South African labour or company law does not yet provide clarity 
as to what the extent of the involvement and level of participation of employees 
should be in corporate decision-making. Although labour law provides for the 
extensive protection of employees the protection is limited, especially when it comes 
to employee participation in corporate decision-making. A relevant question (from a 
corporate law perspective) is should corporate law allow labour law to make inroads 
with regards to employee participation? This is especially relevant when due 
cognisance is taken of the level of employees' participation in corporate decision-
making as well as the function of labour law and the theories and models of 
companies. 
The purpose of this article is to investigate if and how contemporary South-African 
corporate law allows employees' interests into its realm, and to provide an overview 
of the different functions and/or models that apply in both labour and corporate law. 
The topic is a multi-dimensional one. However, this article will not investigate in 
detail the various provisions in the Companies Act with regard to how employees are 
accommodated and if they are accommodated differently from other stakeholders. It 
will also not look in detail at the duties of directors and how or if these duties have 
changed with the introduction of the Companies Act. Finally, this contribution won't 
consider the different board structures and the possibilities of the participation of 
employees in these structures, and will also not address the issue of workplace 
forums and the collective bargaining framework in detail. These matters will be 
addressed in subsequent contributions. 
2 Overlap between corporate and labour law 
Even though developments in the coordination of labour and company law have 
taken place ( in South Africa as elsewhere) they are still regarded as two distinct and 
separate worlds of legal thought, political reality,5 fields of legal scholarship and 
regulatory policy.6 Company law regulates the actions of companies in the market7 
                                        
5 Zumbansen 2006 Ind J Global Legal Studies 272. 
6 Mitchell, O'Donnell and Ramsay 2005 Wis Int'l LJ 417. 
7 Smit 2006 TSAR 152.  
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and usually excludes labour law and employees.8 Abram Chayes once observed that 
the concept of "corporation" not only has economic dimensions but also political, 
legal and social ramifications which extend beyond it.9 The problem, however is that 
these dimensions as "appropriate academic disciplines remain largely unconcerned" 
with each other.10 
Some authors have pointed out that corporate law is primarily about shareholders, 
the board of directors and the relationships between them, and that it occasionally 
concerns itself with other creditors and bondholders.11 Corporate law courses only 
on rare occasions pause to consider the relationship between the corporation and 
worker because the "justification for insulating the concerns of workers from the 
attention of corporate law is that such concerns are the subject of other areas of the 
law, most prominently labour law and employment law."12 
The following is thus evident: 
We infer from the teaching of both corporate governance theoreticians and legal 
scholars that debates on the regulation and conception of corporate governance 
within the framework of 'stakeholder-oriented vs. shareholder-oriented 
perspectives' or 'legal incorporation in company law and labour law vs. 
incorporation in company law or labour law' dichotomies mask a conflict concerning 
more fundamental representations of the world as they question the division of the 
world into an economic and a social sphere.13 
Smit14 addressed the issue of flexibility, her discussion highlighting important 
synergies that exist between the fields of labour and company law and the different 
objectives they have: 
It appears that any labour market reforms will have to take account of 
developments and trends in economic and social spheres as well. In this regard it is 
argued that there are still old unresolved problems relating to the role and place of 
employees in company law that must first be reconsidered before the issue of 
greater flexibility can seriously be entertained.  
                                        
8 Zumbansen 2006 Ind J Global Legal Studies 276. 
9 Zumbansen 2006 Ind J Global Legal Studies 277. 
10 Zumbansen 2006 Ind J Global Legal Studies 277. 
11 Greenfield 1998 BC L Rev 283. 
12 Greenfield 1998 BC L Rev 283. 
13 Cochon 2011 http://etui.org/research/publications 12. 
14 Smit 2006 TSAR 152-153. 
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There are some cross-cutting issues concerning company and labour law as far as 
the issue of flexibility and workers' aspirations are concerned. Many prescriptions 
relating to the organisation of a workplace and rights and duties and employment 
contracts have an impact on the prerogative of management. It should also be 
noted that there are generally limitations to the scope and effect of legal provisions 
and, accordingly, employee protection derived there-from. ... 
Company law regulates the actions of companies in the market. Unfortunately, very 
little attention is bestowed on the interests of employees in company law, either 
nationally or internationally. As far as insolvency law is concerned, the position is 
not much different. There would thus seem to be a vacuum in research in this field, 
since it certainly cannot be argued that employees are not closely connected to the 
companies they work for and on which their livelihoods depend. Employees deserve 
to have more attention paid to their often precarious position. It should be evident 
that labour can only do so much and that other branches of the law, including 
company law, must address some of the new challenges facing markets.15 
Glynn16 adds (in his discussion of the American position) that corporate law, in 
simplified terms, usually purports to serve two kinds of functions. First, it establishes 
the legal form of the firm and it also provides whether its attributes can be waived 
or not. These attributes include its legal personality, equity ownership structure, 
decisional structure, and limited liability.17 Second, corporate law potentially 
addresses three sets of "value-reducing forms of opportunism" or agency problems: 
first, a conflict exists between manager and shareholder interest; second, there is a 
conflict between the interests of controlling and non-controlling shareholders or 
shareholder groups interests; and third, there is a conflict between the interests of 
shareholders and of other stakeholders who may be viewed as outside the firm, 
including employees, creditors, customers, and society as a whole.18 
Although what is said above is true, it does not mean that scholars and lawyers in 
labour law have expressed no interest in the field of company law and vice versa. It 
is thus clear that both corporate law and labour law have provided certain 
fundamental starting points for analysis, each of which shapes the regulatory scope 
of the other. Corporate law, for example, bestows legal personality on business 
entities, and allows such entities to enter into bilateral employment contracts with 
                                        
15 Smit 2006 TSAR 152-153. 
16 Glynn 2009 IJCLLIR 3-14. 
17 Glynn 2009 IJCLLIR 6. 
18 Glynn 2009 IJCLLIR 6. 
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workers.19 Labour law, at the same time, subjects the corporation's actions in 
establishing, conducting, and terminating such employment relationships. Generally 
speaking the "separation" entails that the concerns and problems associated with 
corporate governance are regarded as separate from those problems associated with 
employment regulation.20 It is evident that corporate and labour law affect each 
other, especially with regard to corporate governance and labour management, in 
that "labour law structures and limits what management can do in its relations with 
employees."21 Glynn22 also points out that relegated to the margins in corporate-law 
doctrine are the interests of other constituencies like employees - especially when 
we consider how narrow these concepts are reflected in the language that we use in 
corporate and employment law. This is evident in how firm "ownership" interests are 
described as well as in how the view of what constitutes corporate "internal affairs" 
is limited, and there is a tendency to characterise employment law as concerning the 
relationships between a firm and its employees, not as between employees and 
other stakeholders in the firm (for example managers and shareholders).23 It is 
therefore important when it comes to employee participation in corporate decision-
making to take cognisance of both labour and company law principles. In other 
words, a multi-disciplinary approach is preferable when researching the role, status 
and rights and obligations of employees in the corporation. It can thus be said that 
"while labour law and corporate governance could once have been thought of as 
discrete areas for analysis, it is clear that is no longer the case" as the relationship 
between them "has become both complex and paradoxical".24 
                                        
19 Mitchell, O'Donnell and Ramsay 2005 Wis Int'l LJ 417. 
20 Mitchell, O'Donnell and Ramsay 2005 Wis Int'l LJ 417. 
21 Mitchell, O'Donnell and Ramsay 2005 Wis Int'l LJ 475. 
22 Glynn 2009 IJCLLIR 6. 
23 Glynn 2009 IJCLLIR 6. 
24 Deakin "Workers, Finance and Democracy" 79. 
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3 The different "worlds" of company and labour law 
3.1 The functions of labour law  
Labour law is a concept that is difficult to define because no comprehensive and 
generally accepted definition exists. The notion of "labour law" thus needs 
explanation.25 What is labour law for? is a question with a past and a future.26 In 
some contexts it is understood to refer merely to collective labour relations, while in 
others it covers both individual and collective labour law. The terminological 
difference "is not only of semantic interest" but also indicates totally different 
approaches to labour law.27 Labour law is different from other legal fields because it 
is often: 
promulgated through 'non-legal' (ie political, social, and cultural) processes, 
expressed in the form of 'non-legal' (ie non-state) norms and administered through 
'non-legal' processes (ie those not normally employed by conventional courts).
28
  
When labour law functions in actual workplaces it does not challenge the 
"hegemonic claims of state law and legal institutions" but it provides alternative 
approaches to law such as legal pluralism, reflexive law, and critical theory.29 It is 
thus clear that when labour law is seen from this perspective, it is neither "non-law 
nor a mutant form of law but law incarnate", and constitutes an experiment in social 
ordering that reveals the true nature of the legal system in general.30 
It is accepted, however, that the principal purpose of labour law "is to regulate, to 
support and to restrain the power of management and the power of organised 
labour".31 This argument is based on the viewpoint that labour law acts as a 
countervailing force counteracting the inequality of bargaining power that can be 
found in the employer-employee relationship.32 In their original meanings the words 
                                        
25 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 70. 
26 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 1. 
27 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 70. 
28 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 36-37. 
29 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 36-37. 
30 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 36-37. 
31 Kahn-Freund Labour 8; Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15. 
32 Kahn-Freund Labour 8. 
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"management" and "labour" do not refer to persons but activities,33 which included 
the following: planning and regulating production, distributing, and co-ordinating 
capital and labour on the one hand, and producing and distributing on the other.34 
Today, though, "management" and "labour" are still abstractions and are used to 
denote not the activities but the people who use them. "Management" may be a 
private employer, company, firm, association of employers or an association of 
associations, public corporation, local authority or the state (government).35 The 
word "management" can be used to identify the person or body who has the power 
to define policy, and to make rules and decisions, and can be a production or factory 
manager or the foreman of an assembly line or the head of department or the board 
of directors.36 These persons command their subordinates through instructions given 
by them as managers. "Labour" on the other hand denotes the trade unions with 
which management negotiates, the shop stewards, and the subordinates who are 
members of trade unions.37 A trade union is "an association of employees created 
principally to protect and advance the interests of its members (workers), through 
collective action, and to regulate reactions between employees and employers."38 
The primary function of these unions is to negotiate collective agreements on behalf 
of these members with employers. These negotiations cover issues such as wages 
and work conditions such as working hours, safety at work and benefits. 
In order to trace the distribution of managerial power, society is tasked with a 
difficult assignment. This task is not easier when the means of production are 
publicly owned than when they are privately owned.39 It is also difficult to determine 
where power lies on the side of labour.40 It is thus important to look at the 
function(s) of labour law to see whether the widely formulated purpose is (still) met 
                                        
33 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15. 
34 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15. 
35 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15. 
36 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15. 
37 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15-16. 
38 Barker and Holtzhausen South African Labour Glossary 153. S 213 of the Labour Relations Act 66 
of 1995 (LRA) define a trade union as follows: "A trade union is nothing other than an 
association of employees whose principal purpose is to regulate relations between employees 
and employers, including employers' organisations." 
39 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 17. 
40 Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 17. 
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or not. It must be noted that concepts such as employer and employee and the 
boundaries that they create have a purpose and it is our task "to understand and 
define this purpose, indeed the goal, and thus the very idea, of labour law – and to 
develop the best means (conceptual boundaries and other legal techniques) to 
achieve it.41 Langille,42 a Canadian scholar, noted that the objective of labour law is 
"justice" in employment and productive working relations which will not otherwise be 
obtained if workers in the labour market were still "at a bargaining power 
disadvantage in that contracting process".43 Labour law responds to this basic 
problem, in two ways: first, it secures justice by rewriting the substantive deal 
(mostly by statute) between workers and employers.44 This is done by providing 
labour standards and thus providing for maximum hours, vacations, minimum 
wages, health and safety regulations, and so on. The second technique is 
"responding to the perceived problem … not via the creation of substantive 
entitlements, but rather by way of procedural protection", and thus protecting rights 
to a fair bargaining process.45 
It must be pointed out that two main philosophies concerning the function of labour 
law exist. They are the market and protective views.46 The market view is based 
upon the principles that government intervention plays a role in the attainment of 
prosperity and economic growth. Excessive government intervention can, however, 
lead to economic decline if the market forces are not left to attain economic growth 
and prosperity. The function of labour law is thus not to interfere in market forces 
but to assist them to ensure economic growth and the well-being of employees and 
employers.47 When a successful partnership exists between employers and 
employees they not only have a mutual understanding of one another's needs but 
they also have the shared goal of developing a winning business.48 In terms of the 
                                        
41 Davidov and Langille Boundaries 10. 
42 Langille 2005 EJIL 428-429. 
43 Langille 2005 EJIL 428-429. 
44 Langille 2005 EJIL 428-429. 
45 Langille 2005 EJIL 428-429. 
46 Creighton and Stewart Labour Law 2-3. 
47 Creighton and Stewart Labour Law 5-6. 
48 Wedderburn 2002 ILJ (UK) 99, where he refers to The Partnership at Work Fund: Open for 
Applications (DTI 2002 Application Form). 
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protective view, the imbalance of power places the employee at a disadvantage 
when it comes to bargaining power and resources, and due to this imbalance the 
function of labour law is to protect employees and assist them in redressing the 
imbalance to power.49 It can thus be said that the overriding concern of labour law is 
the protection of employment and employees.50 While labour law seeks to ensure 
the protection of employees it also contributes to organising the production of goods 
or services in firms, because while spelling out the rules that govern the master-
servant relationship in terms of the individual employment contract it is also 
concerned with the centre of power and governed by labour relations.51 
Labour law also addresses the paradox encapsulated in the principle "labour is not a 
commodity", because it regulates employment relationships for two principal 
purposes, namely "to ensure that they function successfully as market transactions, 
and, at the same time, to protect workers against the economic logic of the 
commodification of labour".52 "Labour is not a commodity"53 is perhaps one of the 
most recognised international labour principles and is still proclaimed by the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) today. It has been argued that despite 
radical, socialist and right-wing economists having proclaimed and endorsed this 
principle, it presents us with a paradox because it "asserts as the truth what seems 
to be false".54 In this regard, Collins55 made the following statement: 
                                        
49 Creighton and Stewart Labour Law 2-3. 
50 Zumbansen 2006 Ind J Global Legal Studies 277. 
51 Morin 2005 Int'l Lab Rev 7. 
52 Collins Employment Law 3. 
53 O'Higgins 1997 ILJ (UK) 230 is of the view that three meanings can be attached to the principle 
"Labour is not a commodity": "As used by Ingram, it meant that pricing of labour could not be 
left solely to the operation of the labour market. The level of wages had to be such as to provide 
a reasonable standard of living for a worker and his or her family. The phrase, however, has 
other meanings, as in Noakes v Doncaster Collieries. It also means that a worker cannot be 
transferred from one employer to another without the worker's consent. In the history of the ILO 
it has been given a third significant meaning and explains why the ILO has dedicated so much 
effort to the outlawing of fee-charging employment agencies. It has also been used in the ILO as 
a justification for an ILO Convention outlawing illegal manpower trafficking in migrant labour." 
See also Langille 1998 ILJ 1011, where he points out that the "answer which 'old' labour gave to 
the proponents of market ordering was 'labour is not a commodity'" and that the "answer which 
'new' labour law must give in a globalized economy is that it also follows that 'labour law is not a 
commodity'". 
54 Collins Employment Law 3. 
55 Collins Employment Law 3. 
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Employers buy labour rather like other commodities. The owner of a factory 
purchases the premises, raw materials, machinery, and labour, and combines these 
factors of production to produce goods. A business does not own the worker in the 
same way as it owns the plant, machinery, and raw materials. As a separate legal 
person, the worker is free to take a job or not, subject of course to what Marx 
called 'the dull compulsion of economic necessity'. Without that freedom, workers 
would be slaves. Yet the employer certainly buys or hires the worker's labour for a 
period of time or for a piece of work to be completed. Workers sell their labour 
power - their time, effort, and skill - in return for a wage. As with other market 
transactions dealing with commodities, the legal expression of this relation between 
an employer and employee is a type of contract. The contract of employment, like 
other contracts, confers legally enforceable rights and obligations. It seems that 
labour is in fact regarded much like a commodity in a market society and its laws. 
If labour may still be regarded as a "commodity", this does not necessarily have to 
be the case, as the "wage-work bargain" is still an unequal one. For the business the 
position will be as explained above, but for the worker the unequal nature of the 
bargain affects his status and livelihood, for instance. The inequality exists because 
the employer can accumulate material and human resources, whereas the individual 
employee mostly has very little bargaining power.56 Labour law is in essence about 
power-relations: firstly it is concerned with the relations between the employer on 
the one hand and trade unions on the other, and secondly it is concerned with the 
decision-making power of the employer in the enterprise, which is met by the 
employees' countervailing power.57 The main goal of labour, it appears, "always has 
been to compensate [for] the inequality of the bargaining power".58 The language of 
a "contract" between an employer and an employee is often used, although the 
individual relationship between an employer and an employee is not based on 
contractual equality (or proportionality) of bargaining power but on subordination.59 
The contract of employment tends to "re-establish" (and not destroy) the status 
between an employer and an employee as it specifies the rights of the worker and 
the obligations of the employer, while the rights of the employer and the obligations 
of the worker remain at least in principle "open", "diffuse" or "status-like".60 In 
addition it appears that four more insights (which were analysed by Sinzheimer and 
                                        
56 Collins Employment Law 3. 
57 Collins Employment Law 4. 
58 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 71. 
59 Wedderburn 1993 ILJ (UK) 523. 
60 Wedderburn 1993 ILJ (UK) 523. 
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are relevant in the South African context) became the driving force for labour law 
regulation. These insights can be summarised as follows: 
First, the object of transaction in an employment relationship is not a commodity 
but the human being as such. Or as, later on, the Philadelphia Declaration of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) listed as its first because it makes perfectly 
clear that the labour market is not a market as any other, and therefore cannot 
follow the same rules as other markets do. Second, personal dependency is the 
basic problem of labour law. Third, human dignity may be endangered by the 
employment relationship and, therefore, one of the main goals of labour law is the 
fight for human dignity. This already at a very early stage expresses the goal of the 
ILO's present decent work agenda. It should be stressed that the three above-
mentioned factors – labour not being a commodity, personal dependency as a 
characteristic feature of the employment relationship, and the endangering of 
human dignity – are closely linked to each other. They are the three core aspects of 
the same phenomenon. And they explain why the employment contract is not just a 
contract among others: it establishes a relationship sui generis. Fourth, Sinzheimer 
stressed that labour law cannot be perceived as merely law for the employment 
relationship but has to cover all the needs and risks which have to be met in an 
employee's life, including the law on creation of job opportunities. In other words: 
Sinzheimer understood social security law in its broadest sense as also being an 
inseparable part of labour law.
61
  
In Naptosa v Minister of Education, Western Cape62 the court observed that labour 
law is fundamentally an important as well as extremely sensitive subject, which is 
based upon a political and economic compromise between organised labour and the 
employers of labour. These parties are very powerful socio-economic forces, which 
makes the balance between the two forces a delicate one. The court noted that 
when it comes to their experience with labour relations, as a general rule courts are 
not the best arbiters of the disputes which arise from time to time, and judges do 
not always have the expert knowledge helpful in and sometimes necessary to the 
resolution of labour problems.63 The court then observed the following: 
                                        
61 Davidov and Langille Labour Law 71. Langille 2005 EJIL 429 points out that: "The ethic of 
substantive labour law is strict paternalism and the results are standards imposed upon the 
parties whether they like it or not. The ethic of procedural labour law is freedom of contract and 
self-determination – what people call industrial democracy – and its results are basic rights 
which, it is believed, lead to better, but self-determined, outcomes. These are two different 
approaches to securing the overarching goal of justice in employment relations. Taken together, 
they and the contractual approach they respond to, as joined by the narrative just outlined, are 
labour law - i.e., what makes labour law, labour law, and not family law, or tax law, or anything 
else for that matter." 
62 Naptosa v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 ILJ 889 (C) 897. 
63 Naptosa v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 ILJ 889 (C) 897. 
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The words of McIntyre J
64
 (reported at (1987) 38 DLR (4th) 161 at 232) are 
peculiarly apt in the case of judicial interference with matters which in labour law 
are regarded as matters of mutual interest; but they are also true, I think, where a 
court is, in a highly regulated environment, asked to fashion a remedy which the 
legislature has not seen fit to provide.
65
 
3.2 South African labour law 
3.2.1 Who is an employee? 
For purposes of labour protection as well as the rights granted in terms of company 
law it is important to note that the definition of an employee is central to the 
discussion. Labour legislation has expanded the definition of "employee" beyond the 
common law definition of someone who places his or her labour potential under the 
control of another person, in order to extend protection to as many persons as 
possible. 
In terms of section 213 of the LRA, an employee is defined as: 
(a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, who works for any person or 
for the State and who receives, or is entitled to receive, any remuneration;  
(b) any other person who in any manner assists in carrying on or conducting the 
business of the employer. 
The common law definition of an employee has been expanded in order to extend 
protection to as many persons as possible. The definitions of "employee" in the LRA 
as well as the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA); the 
Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993; (COIDA), the 
Unemployment Insurance Act 63 of 2001 (UIA); and the Skills Development Act 97 
of 1998 (SDA) all expressly exclude an independent contractor from the definition of 
"employee". Our law has always distinguished between employees and independent 
                                        
64 McIntyre J in Re Public Service Employee Relations Act 1987 38 DLR (4th) 161, expressed the 
following view: "Labour law … is a fundamentally important as well as extremely sensitive 
subject. It is based upon a political and economic compromise between organised labour – a 
very powerful socio-economic force – on the one hand, and the employers of labour – an equally 
powerful socio-economic force – on the other. The balance between the two forces is delicate … 
Our experience with labour relations has shown that the courts, as a general rule, are not the 
best arbiters of disputes which arise from time to time … Judges do not have the expert 
knowledge always helpful and sometimes necessary in the resolution of labour problems." 
65 Naptosa v Minister of Education, Western Cape 2001 ILJ 889 (C) 897. 
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contractors. The difference is important because the legal rights of each category 
vary considerably. Generally, employees are protected by labour law whereas 
independent contractors are not.66 It is therefore clear that a contract of mandate, 
which involves an independent contractor, is specifically excluded for example from 
doctrines such as that of vicarious liability.67 In 2002 the LRA68 and the BCEA69 were 
amended to include the rebuttable presumption of employment in order to assist 
persons who claim to be employees rather than independent contractors. These 
factors are: (i) the manner in which the person works is subject to the control or 
direction of another person; (ii) the person's hours of work are subject to the control 
or direction of another person; (iii) in the case of a person who works for an 
organisation, the person forms part of that organisation; (iv) the person has worked 
for that person for an average of at least 40 hours per month over the last three 
months; (v) the person is economically dependent on the other person for whom he 
or she works or renders services; (vi) the person is provided with tools of trade or 
work equipment by the other person; or (vii) the person works for or renders service 
                                        
66 See Kylie v CCMA 2010 7 BLLR 705 (LAC), where the court determined that an employment 
relationship existed between a sex worker and her employer, even if the contract of employment 
was void for illegality. In Ndikumdavyi v Valkenberg Hospital 2012 8 BLLR 795 (LC) the applicant 
was a Burundian refugee, trained and qualified in South Africa. The court in Ndikumdavyi found 
it necessary to indicate that it is necessary to distinguish that matter from Kylie, in that the court 
in Kylie was concerned with the rendering of illegal services in what the law regards as a criminal 
activity whereas in the latter matter the applicant was unable to continue the rendering of legal 
services because a permanent appointment was prohibited by statute (para 24). See also Smit 
and Botha 2011 TSAR 815-829, where they discuss whether or not members of parliament are 
employees and employers for purposes of the Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000. 
67 See Langley Fox Building Partnership (Pty) Ltd v De Valance 1991 1 SA 1 (A) 8; Smit v 
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A), where the court listed factors that 
are indicative of an employment relationship as well as Midway Two Engineering & Construction 
Services v Transnet Bpk 1998 3 SA 17 (SCA) 23. Niselow v Liberty Life Association of Africa Ltd 
1998 ILJ 752 (SCA) dealt with the definition of "employee" in terms of the Labour Relations Act 
28 of 1956. The court in the Niselow case held (753I) that an employee at common law 
undertakes to render a personal service to an employer. The court further held that regardless of 
the second part of the definition ("… any other person whomsoever who in any manner assists in 
the carrying on or conducting of the business of an employer") it did not bring the individual in 
that case within the scope of the definition. The court based this decision on distinguishing a 
contract of work and a contract of service. Consequently, the appellant in that case, who was an 
agent contracted to canvass insurance business for the respondent, was carrying on and 
conducting his own business rather than assisting in the carrying on or conducting of the 
business of the respondent. In the labour appeal court the court noted, however, that the 
supreme court of appeal "did not have the benefit of argument on the second part of the 
definition of 'employee'" (see also Smit and Botha 2011 TSAR 815-829). 
68 S 200A of the LRA. 
69 S 83A of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act 75 of 1997 (BCEA). 
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to only one person. In this regard, however, what Acting Judge Van Niekerk stated 
in Discovery Health Limited v CCMA must be noted:70 
The protection against unfair labour practices established by s 23(1) of the 
Constitution is not dependent on a contract of employment. Protection extends 
potentially to other contracts, relationships and arrangements in terms of [which] a 
person performs work or provides personal services to another. The line between 
performing work 'akin to employment' and the provision of services as part of a 
business is a matter regulated by the definition of 'employee' in s 213 of the LRA. 
(own emphasis) 
3.2.2 Perspectives on South African labour law 
The purpose of the LRA is expressly set out in the Act, namely to advance economic 
development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace 
through the promotion of: (i) orderly collective bargaining, (ii) collective bargaining 
at sectoral level, (iii) employee participation in decision-making in the workplace and 
(iv) the effective resolution of labour disputes.71 The function of South African labour 
law, it is submitted, is firstly to protect and promote the interests of employees in 
order to address this imbalance between them and employers. Before the enactment 
of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 and the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) there was a 
serious debate regarding whether labour rights should or should not be provided for 
in the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. In this regard Olivier72 points out that: 
It is sometimes argued that labour rights are so-called second generation or socio-
economic rights and that they place a duty upon the state to act in a positive 
manner. They have to be contrasted with rights that protect an individual against 
undue interference by the state. For this reason, it is said, labour rights should not 
be contained in a bill of rights, since the courts cannot enforce them without 
intruding upon the terrain of the legislature and/or the executive branch of 
government. The truth, however, is that some labour rights, such as the right to 
associate freely and the right to strike, do not essentially differ from other classical 
human rights and may be enforced in like manner. 
As noted earlier when we discussed the market view of labour law, the Government 
or the state is an important role player involved in labour relations. The concept of 
state corporatism in the context of labour law becomes relevant. It represents "the 
                                        
70 Discovery Health Limited v CCMA 2008 ILJ 1480 (LC) 1494 para 41. 
71 S 1 of the LRA. 
72 Olivier 1993 TSAR 657. 
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growth of formalised links between the state and autonomous economic groups", 
such as labour and capital, ranging from consultation to more formal negotiation 
initiatives over economic outcomes.73 The state plays a more interventionist role in 
economic management, on the one hand by limiting the autonomy of collective 
parties, and on the other by granting access to government policy-making to 
representative institutions of labour and capital.74 Government "takes measures to 
protect the individual employee against possible abuses by the employer through 
protective labour legislation" and "may also try to develop rules to regulate to a 
certain extent the power relations between capital and labour with a view to 
protecting society as a whole."75 There are two broad perspectives on the extent to 
which the state should intervene in the labour market.76 They are the libertarian and 
social justice perspectives. 
3.2.2.1 The libertarian perspective 
The libertarian or free-market model regards the contract of employment and the 
accompanying "individual bargain, which it represents as the only legitimate 
mechanism to regulate the employment relationship".77 Proponents of this view treat 
labour legislation "with the disdain normally reserved for an alien plant species, an 
unwelcome intruder invading the indigenous landscape of the common law and 
imposing unwarranted regulation on the freedom to contract on equal terms in the 
marketplace", and it is argued that statutory regulation in the labour market is 
inconsistent with what is referred to as a "right to work under any conditions".78 
They argue that laws intended for the protection of employees have the unintended 
consequence of protecting the employed at the expense of the unemployed, and 
thus legitimate protection for employees is afforded by the "effective and adequate 
common law and the resultant sellers' market in which employers will be required to 
compete for labour by offering ever-improving" terms and conditions of 
                                        
73 Deakin and Morris Labour Law 27. 
74 Deakin and Morris Labour Law 27. 
75 Blanpain 1974 ILJ (UK) 5-6. 
76 Van Niekerk Law@work 6. 
77 Van Niekerk Law@work 6-7. 
78 Van Niekerk Law@work 6-7. 
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employment.79 The proponents of this view argue that when labour legislation is 
abolished it will be beneficial for employees and the broader society. A case for 
deregulation has been put in South Africa too, where it has been argued that the 
individual contract of employment as opposed to any form of collective agreement is 
the best means to ensure the greatest possible degree of flexibility and 
competitiveness.80 
It appears that the denial or violation of core labour standards does not result in a 
comparative advantage. Research actually indicates that the contrary is true, and 
shows that poor labour conditions "often signal low productivity or are one element 
of a package of national characteristics that discourage foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows or inhibit export performance".81 If labour economics are set aside, 
however, a number of external limitations on the nature and extent of any 
deregulation of the South African labour market can be put forward. First, as a 
member of the ILO South Africa has ratified all of the ILO's core conventions82 and 
thus incurred international law obligations to uphold the rights to freedom of 
association, to promote collective bargaining, to ensure equality at work, and to 
eliminate forced labour and child labour.83 The labour law reforms that were 
introduced in 1995 assured that South Africa met these obligations. The Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 1998 obliges member states 
(including South Africa) to observe the principles that underlie certain core 
conventions. Second, the Constitution recognises certain core labour rights, in 
accordance with which the Preamble describes the aim of the Constitution to be to 
                                        
79 Van Niekerk Law@work 7. 
80 Van Niekerk Law@work 7. 
81 Van Niekerk Law@work 7. 
82 In terms of the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998) the 
members have a constitutional obligation to promote and realise four "core" or fundamental 
rights. These rights are freedom of association and free collective bargaining, the elimination of 
forced labour, the abolition of child labour, and the elimination of discrimination. These rights 
must be promoted even though the relevant conventions were not ratified by member states. 
South Africa, however, ratified all the conventions relating to these four "core" rights. These 
conventions include Freedom of Association and the Right to Organise Convention (1948) (No 
87); Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949) (No 98); Forced Labour 
Convention (1930) (No 29); Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957) (No 105); Minimum 
Age Convention (1973) (No 138); Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999) (No 184); 
Equal Remuneration Convention (1951) (No 100); and Discrimination (Employment And 
Occupation) Convention (1958) (No 111). 
83 Van Niekerk Law@work 8. 
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"[h]eal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, 
social justice and fundamental human rights".84 In Minister of Finance v Van 
Heerden85 the court in this regard stated as follows: 
Of course, democratic values and fundamental human rights espoused by our 
Constitution are foundational. But just as crucial is the commitment to strive for a 
society based on social justice. In this way, our Constitution heralds not only equal 
protection of the law and non-discrimination but also the start of a credible and 
abiding process of reparation for past exclusion, dispossession, and indignity within 
the discipline of our constitutional framework. 
The Constitution provides in particular for the right to fair labour practices as a 
fundamental right, and thus implies that "social justice is a necessary precondition 
for creating a durable economy and society, and places obvious limitations on the 
policy choices open to those who seek to regulate the labour market".86 Labour 
market policy cannot be only a matter of economics, because the Constitution needs 
to be taken into account when choices are made and the limitation of constitutional 
rights is considered.87 The social justice obligation is also provided for in the LRA and 
the BCEA. 
3.2.2.2 A social justice perspective 
According to the social justice perspective trade unions are regarded as primary 
vehicles through which social justice is achieved.88 This notion is based upon Sir Otto 
Kahn-Freund's conception of labour law, which was put forward in the 1950s and 
1960s as a means of counteracting the inequality of bargaining power between 
employers and employees (see the discussion above). This equilibrium, according to 
Kahn-Freund, can be best achieved and maintained through voluntary collective 
bargaining, and the law plays only a secondary role as "it regulates, supports and 
constrains the power of management and organised labour".89 The interests of 
                                        
84 S 1 of the Constitution. See for example Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC) para 1, where it was stated that: "[t]he people of South Africa are 
committed to the attainment of social justice and the improvement of the quality of life for 
everyone. The Preamble of the Constitution records this commitment". 
85 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 12 BLLR 1181 (CC) para 25. 
86 Van Niekerk Law@work 8. 
87 Van Niekerk Law@work 8. 
88 Van Niekerk Law@work 8. 
89 See Davies and Freedland Kahn-Freund 15 as well as Van Niekerk Law@work 9. 
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parties and their respective power drive the process of bargaining and the outcomes 
of the process. If a more recent social justice perspective were to be applied, it 
might not only "acknowledge collective bargaining as an important means to define 
and enforce protection for workers" but also "recognise rights as a complementary 
and perhaps more significant medium to promote social justice in the workplace".90 
The Constitution (as noted above) as well as the enabling legislation such as the 
LRA, BCEA and Employment Equity Act (EEA)91 plays a very important role not only 
in the protection of the right to fair labour practices, but also with regard to rights to 
freedom of association, freedom of expression, privacy and equality. While statutory 
rights, their nature and scope, and how they are implemented and enforced are 
important in the protection of workers' rights, they are not absolute, however, and 
may often need to be balanced against the competing rights of employers and third 
parties.92 Dispute resolution institutions such as the Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and labour courts (as well as other courts) play a 
fundamental role as labour rights are enforced, assessed, and if necessary balanced 
with other competing rights.93 The acknowledgement of human rights, including 
fundamental labour rights, is an important corporate responsibility for companies in 
South Africa as well as for multi-national companies generally. Corporate governance 
and social responsibility programmes play a significant role in the establishment and 
enforcement of basic labour rights, "especially in host countries that have little in the 
way of labour market regulation, or where to attract investment or for want of 
resources, minimum labour standards are not enforced".94 These developments may 
serve to promote collective bargaining (to the extent that basic labour rights include 
the rights to organise and to bargain collectively), especially in those environments 
where the legislative environment remains hostile.95 
It can thus be said that labour law originated by focusing on employment relations in 
order to regulate the conditions of tangible labour and to extend protection to 
                                        
90 Van Niekerk Law@work 10. 
91 Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
92 Van Niekerk Law@work 10. 
93 Van Niekerk Law@work 10. 
94 Van Niekerk Law@work 10. 
95 Van Niekerk Law@work 10. 
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workers' physical bodies. It then evolved to protect "employment" and to organise 
workers collectively within the enterprise (which is the economic locus of decision-
making) to reach the point where workers' interests are taken into account and 
workers have input into decision making.96 
It is therefore submitted that regardless of the view taken of the true function of 
labour law, the right of employees to participate in decisions affecting them and/or 
the enterprise is today included under the purpose and function of labour laws. 
3.2.3 The employer (managerial) prerogative 
The theory of the normative field of law proposes that "the law comprises of a 
multitude of – often conflicting - legal norms, and therefore forms all but a 
consistent and hierarchical legal 'system'".97 Within this multitude of legal norms a 
number of basic normative patterns can be distinguished which reflect social as well 
as moral concepts that are central to human relations and society at large.98 In the 
normative field of labour law "the market functional pattern (a composite pattern 
representing normative conceptions central to the functioning of the market 
economy) can be divided into two different normative patterns, the managerial 
prerogative and freedom of contract".99 The managerial prerogative has its 
foundation in the right of property and the proprietor's right of disposition, whereas 
protection of the established position, "manifest as employment protection, 
[secures] the continued employment of those already employed (that is those who 
have already established a position in the company and in the labour market)".100 
The managerial prerogative: 
signifies the power of the employer to regulate the issues pertaining to the 
organization and function of the undertaking aiming to attain its goals, and more 
                                        
96 Morin 2005 Int'l Lab Rev 11. 
97 Rönnmar 2004 Int J Hum Resourc Man 455. 
98 Rönnmar 2004 Int J Hum Resourc Man 455. 
99 Rönnmar 2004 Int J Hum Resourc Man 455. 
100 Rönnmar 2004 Int J Hum Resourc Man 455. Original emphasis. 
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precisely, to determine the kind, the place, the manner, and the time of labour 
provision by the worker specifying in this way his labour performance.
101
  
In BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers (2)102 the court stated that "the 
right to trade includes the right to manage that business, often referred to as the 
managerial prerogative".103 
The decision-making power in employers (and thus corporations who are employers) 
is upheld in the free market economy by four notions: 
(i) the right to property, which enables the owner to dispose of his property as 
he wishes in order to obtain benefit from it;  
(ii) freedom of commerce and industry, where every citizen obtains the freedom 
to engage in commerce, profession, craft or industry;  
(iii) freedom of association, which enables an individual to combine his resources 
in a trade or industry with that of others and form a corporation in order to 
share profits; and  
(iv) obtaining power over people, where a worker has the freedom to enter into 
an individual labour contract with an employer he selected and where the 
employer obtains the power to command the employee to obey.104  
It must be noted that in terms of these notions the power to manage the enterprise 
belongs to the employer. In this context of the managerial prerogative it is 
noteworthy to point out that: 
[t]he law give the employer the right to manage the enterprise. He can tell the 
employees what they must and must not do, and he can say what will happen to 
them if they disobey. He must, of course, keep within the contract, the collective 
agreement and the legal rules that govern him. ... But, even given these 
constraints, he still has a wide managerial discretion. He can decide which 
production line the employees should work on; whether they should take their tea 
break at ten or ten fifteen; when they may go on leave; and countless other 
matters besides. He can also decide what will happen to the employees if they do 
not work properly, if they go to tea early and so on. In short, it is he who within the 
limits referred to, lays down the norms and standards of the enterprise. This – at 
                                        
101 Papadimitriou 2009 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 273. 
102 BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers (2) 1989 10 ILJ 701 (IC). 
103 BTR Dunlop Ltd v National Union of Metalworkers (2) 1989 10 ILJ 701 (IC) 705C. 
104 Blanpain 1974 ILJ (UK) 6. 
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least as far as the law is concerned – is what 'managerial prerogative' entails, no 
more and no less.
105
 
It can also be pointed out that "prerogative" refers to the right to make decisions 
regarding the aims of the organisation as well as the ways in which the organisation 
will achieve these aims.106 These decisions can be divided into two broad categories: 
The first relates to decisions about the human resources utilised by the 
organisation. Typically, but not necessarily, organisations will make use of 
employees to achieve their aims. Decisions will have to be taken as to the number 
and types of employees needed, their terms and conditions of employment, the 
termination of their employment, where and when and how they do their work, and 
the supervision of their work. 
The other category of decisions can be described as decisions of an 'economic' or 
'business' nature. These include decisions relating to the acquisition and/use of 
physical assets needed by the organisation and decisions regarding the aims of the 
organisation, the products it produces or the services it provides.
107
 
The managerial prerogative is usually seen as being of special importance when 
dealing with decisions about the human resources utilised by the organisation, 
because it is linked to the employer's ability to control the activities of employees in 
the workplace.108 
3.2.4 Principles of fairness 
The Constitution (as pointed out earlier) also, for example, provides that everyone 
has a right to fair labour practice.109 The Constitutional Court in National Education 
Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town110 held that: 
Our Constitution is unique in constitutionalizing the right to fair labour practice. But 
the concept is not defined in the Constitution. The concept of fair labour practice is 
not capable of precise definition. This problem is compounded by the tension 
between the interests of the workers and the interest of employers that is inherent 
in labour relations. Indeed what is fair depends upon the circumstances of a 
                                        
105 Brassey et al New Labour Law 74. 
106 Strydom 1999 SA Merc LJ 42. 
107 Strydom 1999 SA Merc LJ 42. 
108 Strydom 1999 SA Merc LJ 42. 
109 S 23(1)(a) of the Constitution. 
110 National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 
(CC). 
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particular case and essentially involves a value judgment. It is therefore neither 
necessary nor desirable to define this concept.
111
 
This fundamental right is extended not only to employees but also to employers. 
With reference to fairness the Constitutional Court (in National Education Health & 
Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town)112 further held: 
Where the rights in the section are guaranteed to workers or employers or trade 
unions or employers' organizations as the case may be, the Constitution says so 
explicitly. If the rights in s 23(1) were to be guaranteed to workers only, the 
Constitution should have said so. The basic flaw in the applicant's submission is that 
it assumes that all employers are juristic persons. That is not so. In addition, 
section 23(1) must apply either to all employers or none. It should make no 
difference whether they are natural or juristic persons. 
It is thus clear that fairness is an underlying principle that is applied in labour law. 
This brings us to the LRA, which provides, for example, for the protection of 
employees against unfair labour practices and unfair dismissal. Section 186(2) of the 
LRA contains the definition of an unfair labour practice113 whereas section 186(1) 
contains the definition of dismissal. Section 188(1) of the LRA provides that if a 
dismissal is not automatically unfair, it is unfair if the employer fails to prove 
substantive fairness (that the reason for dismissal is a fair reason related to the 
employee's conduct or capacity, or based on the employer's operational 
requirements) and procedural fairness (that the dismissal was effected in accordance 
with a fair procedure). Section 187 of the LRA provides for the category of 
                                        
111 National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) 
para 33. 
112 National Education Health & Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town 2003 24 ILJ 95 (CC) 
para 39. 
113 In National Entitled Workers' Union v CCMA 2003 24 ILJ 2335 (LC) 2339 the court explained that 
the concept "unfair labour practice" recognises the rightful place of equity and fairness in the 
workplace and in particular that what is lawful may be unfair. The court refers to Poolman 
Principles of Unfair Labour Practice 11 where he summarises the strength and nature of the 
concept. He says: "The concept 'unfair labour practice' is an expression of the consciousness of 
modern society of the value of the rights, welfare, security and dignity of the individual and 
groups of individuals in labour practices. The protection envisaged by the legislature in 
prohibiting unfair labour practices underpins the reality that human conduct cannot be legislated 
for in precise terms. The law cannot anticipate the boundaries of fairness or unfairness of labour 
practices. The complex nature of labour practices does not allow for such rigid regulation of what 
is fair or unfair in any particular circumstance. Labour practices draw their strength from the 
inherent flexibility of the concept 'fair'. This flexibility provides means of giving effect to the 
demands of modern industrial society for the development of an equitable, systematized body of 
labour law. The flexibility of 'fairness' will amplify existing labour law in satisfying the needs for 
which the law itself is too rigid." 
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"automatically unfair dismissals". The section lists a number of reasons for dismissal 
that, if established, mean that the dismissal of the employee is unfair simply by 
virtue of the reason for the dismissal. It is therefore not open to the employer to 
justify its decision to dismiss the employee in terms of section 187 (with limited 
exceptions relating to the inherent requirements of a job and the employee reaching 
the agreed or normal retirement age). 
3.2.5 Collective bargaining  
One of the central themes of the LRA is the fact that collectivism rather than 
individualism is promoted. Democratic attributes can be found at the heart of 
collective action.114 Collective rights such as the right to organise, the right to strike 
and collective bargaining are in addition to the fundamental status provided for by 
the Constitution115 also underwritten by the LRA. The inequality in bargaining power 
in the employment relationship coupled with the incomplete nature of the 
employment contract116 leads to the inability of employees to take part in decisions 
that directly affect their lives. This is evident from the fact that "employees are 
commonly subjected to control of their employers/managers over different aspects 
of their working lives" and thus the employment relationship is characterised by 
democratic deficits.117 If employees are not allowed to associate and act collectively 
the unequal bargaining position between the employer and employees will remain.118 
Employees and their trade unions can become entitled to collective rights and their 
rights in formal equality only if these rights are guaranteed.119 In Minister of Finance 
v Van Heerden120 the court said the following with regard to the achievement of 
substantive equality: 
                                        
114 Davidov 2004 IJCLLIR 84. 
115 See s 23(2)-(5) of the Constitution. 
116 Kaufman Theoretical Perspectives 55 points out that not all terms and conditions and 
performance requirements can be anticipated and set down in writing "ex ante" when an 
employee starts work and an employment contract is entered into. The employment relationship 
thus requires ongoing "administration, negotiation and adjustment while the incomplete nature 
of the employment contract opens the door for conflict, misunderstanding, and opportunistic 
behaviour as the employer and employee seek to exploit contractual gaps and holes to their 
advantage". 
117 Davidov 2004 IJCLLIR 84. 
118 Olivier 1993 TSAR 658. 
119 Olivier 1993 TSAR 659. 
120 Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 12 BLLR 1181 (CC) paras 23-24, 31. 
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For good reason, the achievement of equality preoccupies our constitutional 
thinking. … the commitment of the Preamble is to restore and protect the equal 
worth of everyone, to heal the divisions of the past and to establish a caring and 
socially just society. In explicit terms, the Constitution commits our society to 
'improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person'. … it 
confers the right to equal protection and benefit of the law and the right to non-
discrimination. But it also imposes a positive duty on all organs of state to protect 
and promote the achievement of equality – a duty which binds the judiciary too. … 
The achievement of equality goes to the bedrock of our constitutional architecture. 
…  Thus the achievement of equality is not only a guaranteed and justifiable right in 
our Bill of Rights, but also a core and fundamental value; a standard that must 
inform all law and against which all law must be tested for constitutional 
consonance. 
In addition, it has been said that: 
Promoting justice and dignity in the workplace should be perceived to be as 
important to the individual as promoting justice and dignity in society generally 
through protecting freedom of worship and freedom of expression and should thus 
stand at the core of fundamental human rights. Moreover, given the economic and 
social and even political power of employers, rights at work have an inherent 
collectivist dimension. Thus the ability of workers to organize collectively in a trade 
union should be seen as a fundamental freedom within a human rights 
framework.
121
 
Collective bargaining plays a key role in social legislation (but not so in corporate 
law).122 In a general sense collective bargaining refers to the process of negotiation 
between an employer or groups of employers and trade union(s) with the intention 
of creating collective agreements. Collective bargaining is still the principal way (in 
South Africa) in which trade unions seek to improve the working conditions of their 
members. The collective agreements which trade unions enter into with employers 
embody both fairness and efficiency and "help create a climate of good industrial 
relations which, in turn, leads to an increase in productivity and a reduction in staff 
                                        
121 Welch 1996 ILJ (UK) 1041-1042. 
122 Deakin and Morris Labour Law 5 points out that the term social legislation in the broad sense 
refers to the field of employment law and may be one of two types, namely regulatory legislation 
or auxiliary legislation. Regulatory legislation "directly affects employment relationships, typically 
by laying down statutory norms that override the parties' own agreement" and can for example 
include minimum wage legislation and unfair dismissal legislation (that limits the power of the 
employer to terminate the employment relationship). Auxiliary legislation "consists of legal 
supports for the process of collective bargaining and other aspects of collective organisation; in 
this sense its impact on the relationship is indirect". Examples of auxiliary legislation include 
those which may require employers to recognise trade unions for the purposes of collective 
bargaining as well as those which oblige employers to consult with or provide representatives of 
the workforce with information. 
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turnover".123 The benefits of collective bargaining are, of course, contested, 
"principally by neo-classical economists who see unions as 'labour cartel' organisers 
which are able to extract higher 'rents' for their members over and above the market 
rate for the job".124 Through the incorporation of a social dialogue the value of 
collective bargaining to a well-functioning economy is recognised, as it also endorses 
the principle of collective autonomy. It can thus be said that collective agreements 
have two functions: "the procedural or contractual function of regulating the 
relationships between the collective parties themselves and the normative or rule-
making function, which consists of the establishment of terms and conditions which 
are applicable to the contracts of individual workers".125 The right to engage in 
collective bargaining by trade unions, employers' organisations and employers is also 
recognised by the Constitution. The Constitutional Court has pointed out that: 
[c]ollective bargaining is based on the recognition of the fact that employers enjoy 
greater social and economic power than individual workers. Workers therefore need 
to act in concert to provide them collectively with sufficient power to bargain 
effectively with employers.
126
  
Collective bargaining can also take place at either company/enterprise/plant level or 
at sectoral level.127 The unequal bargaining power that one individual has against 
that of the employer can now be addressed, when employees act collectively for 
example, through the process of collective bargaining, negotiations and strikes to 
mention only a few. Workers can rectify the inequality by "joining forces and acting 
in concert" because the employer can be expected (even for a limited time) to be 
more concerned about the prospect of losing the work of all (or some) its 
employees.128 When it comes to the managerial prerogative of the employer the 
question, however, is how labour will influence this power.129 
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Decisions can be influenced in different ways involving disclosing and sharing 
information, advice and consultation, co-decision-making or the self-management of 
employees.130 Employee participation should be evident on all of these levels. 
By bargaining collectively, employees gain some countervailing power to that of the 
employer.131 Collective bargaining can thus address the inequality that flows from 
the power relationship between employers and employees. This does not necessarily 
mean that the parties at the negotiation table possess equal bargaining power, but 
the "imbalance of power can be expected to be much less dramatic under a regime 
of collective bargaining", and once the position of the employees improves at the 
bargaining table, "the problem of democratic deficits is also to be expected to be 
alleviated".132 It is thus clear that the pluralist philosophy133 is central here. 
According to this philosophy the main object of labour law has always been and will 
always be "to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining 
power which is inherent and must be inherent in the employment relationship".134 
On this point Du Toit135 elaborates: 
It may well be true that functions of 'labour' (direct production) and 'management' 
(co-ordination of production) will need to be fulfilled in any economic system ... 
What pluralism fails to establish, however, is that inequality of wealth, knowledge 
and power must necessarily exist between members of society fulfilling these 
respective functions. 
Collective bargaining, however, does have its limits. A growing number of individuals 
are excluded from collective bargaining because their work status falls outside the 
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133 Own emphasis. The pluralist industrial relations paradigm works as follows: it analysis "work and 
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[formal] employment model and they are thus not covered by collective 
agreements.136 Collective bargaining also fails to take into account a wide range of 
regulatory influences that fall outside the labour law framework, and thus: 
the debate which affects the interests of 'labour' and 'workers' today, in addition to 
the debate concerning employment conditions and job regulation (labour law), 
substantially occurs in legal and regulatory categories that do not directly regulate 
the employment relationship itself.
137
 
The right to strike accompanied by the freedom of association are integral in 
attaining industrial democracy and are also fundamental to achieving successful 
collective bargaining. Four justifications exist for the right to strike: 
the equilibrium argument – labour needs a tool to resist the otherwise total 
prerogative of management; the need for autonomous sanctions to enforce 
collective bargains – self-government being better than legal regulation and 
enforcement; the voluntary labour argument – that compulsion to work is nothing 
else than serfdom; and the psychological argument – that strikes are a necessary 
release of tension in industrial relations.
138
 
The right to strike is thus a powerful economic weapon in the hands of 
employees.139 It must, however, be stressed that the "operation of collective 
bargaining would be undermined if trade unions did not have the power to put 
pressure on employers or employers' associations to enter into collective agreements 
on reasonable terms".140 Because collective action is the means of equalising the 
power of the employer and it is the most important and effective way that 
employees have to express their concerns, it can thus be said that "strike action is 
the corollary of collective bargaining".141 
It is noteworthy that the notion of employees being able to control or influence 
decisions affecting their working lives is central to industrial democracy, in that 
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employees have the opportunity to participate in decision-making.142 Furthermore, 
industrial democracy includes not only employee participation but also issues such as 
participative management, employee involvement and workers' control, and thus 
emphasises particular forms of industrial democracy. These forms of industrial 
democracy can range from human management techniques, where boxes are set up 
to receive employees' written suggestions, to more fundamental forms such as 
participation on supervisory boards.143 Industrial democracy can also be divided into 
two categories: control through ownership and control against ownership. 
i. Control through ownership initiatives "accept[s] the right of 
capitalists/shareholders to exercise direct control, but seek[s] to acquire this 
right by converting the workers themselves into owners", where they obtain 
more or less control of the company by acquiring shares.144  
ii. Control against ownership initiatives "challenge[s] the belief that ownership of 
a firm gives capitalists/shareholders the right to exercise control, and seek to 
expropriate those rights for the workers".145  
In a democratic firm, control can be vested in the hands of employees in at least two 
ways: 
The first way is influence. This refers to the extent to which employees influence 
decision-making, and the extent can range from no employee influence on one end 
of the spectrum to unilateral influence at the other end. Between these two 
extremes, employers may advise employees on decisions they have already made 
regarding the operation of the firm, consult with them, or bargain with them.146 
Consultation must, however, not be confused with collective bargaining. In Metal & 
Allied Workers Union v Hart Ltd147 the court noted that there is a distinct and 
substantial difference between consultation and bargaining. The court explained this 
difference as follows: 
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To consult means to take counsel or seek information or advice from someone and 
does not imply any kind of agreement, whereas to bargain means to haggle or 
wrangle so as to arrive at some agreement on terms of give and take. The term 
negotiate is akin to bargaining and means to confer with a view to compromise and 
agreement.148 
Consultation in terms of the LRA appears to be "identical to what was previously 
understood as 'good faith' bargaining" where consensus must be reached.149 The 
employer must also disclose relevant information and consider all representations by 
the consulting partner, and where it does not agree with the consulting party 
provide reasons for the disagreement.150 It can thus be said that consultation 
involves "representatives of management seeking and listening to employee 
suggestions and opinions, considering these opinions but then making the final 
decision themselves" whereas bargaining "involves management and employees 
compromising to reach a mutually acceptable decision".151 The LRA, for example, 
also makes provision for workplace forums. This is one of the mechanisms that were 
introduced by the LRA to provide workers with a voice in the workplace. Workplace 
forums152 drew upon the model of the German works council system and were 
enacted to "introduce a form of participatory workplace governance" and to create a 
system of participatory decision-making in addition to or alongside (adversarial) 
collective bargaining.153 Consultation (in the context of workplace forums), for 
example, is required for the matters listed in section 84 of the LRA, whereas joint 
decision-making is required for the matters listed in section 86. Consultation requires 
the employer "to do more than notify the forum of any proposal and in good faith to 
consider any suggestions it may make."154 The idea of the drafters of the LRA (and a 
novel one it seems to be) was to depart from the tradition of collective bargaining 
between trade unions and employers, to provide instead for "more co-operative 
interaction between management and labour alongside collective bargaining" in 
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order to allow non-wage issues "that previously fell within the scope of managerial 
prerogative"155 to be dealt with through consultation and joint-decision-making. 
The second dimension is the level at which employees are involved in the decision-
making process as well as the level at which they are allowed to participate. Two 
variables determine the level of employee participation, namely the manner or 
directness of worker control and the scope of the matters, which are decided with 
worker input. The directness of control varies from a direct or participatory level of 
interaction between the management and the employees at the workplace to an 
indirect or representational level of interaction between employee representatives 
(who are elected or nominated by the employees) and the management.156 The 
scope of matters that can be dealt with varies from employee influence at higher 
levels of the organisation such as the distribution of profits, investments, financing 
and budgets, to lower levels such as annual leave entitlements, the administration of 
welfare services etcetera.157  
It must thus be noted that due cognisance must not only be given to representation 
at workplace/enterprise level but also to collective bargaining. From this it is thus 
evident that the function of labour law traditionally relies significantly on collective 
bargaining to address the inequality of the relationship between employers and 
employees. Much of the debate today is concerned with placing the company (the 
corporation) in a greater social context, and by doing this labour law and the rights 
of employees are slowly becoming part of corporate responsibility agendas.158 
Consequently, some submit that where a wider perspective on the business 
corporation is taken, labour law not only meets employee-ownership theories but 
also takes stakeholder capitalism models into account".159 When the split between 
labour and company law is made, a division between "economic" and social matters 
is often made. It has been pointed out that this should not be taken for granted but 
should rather be considered to be a social construction, because "this distinction 
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does not explain why employee participation should be acceptable in the social 
sphere but not in the economic sphere, when the reality is that measures adopted in 
the social sphere will have an impact on the economic sphere"160 and vice versa.161 
It is thus evident that there is indeed an integration of company and labour law 
principles when it comes to the employees' voice in companies. It is evident that 
corporate law can no longer primarily focus on shareholders and ignore employees 
as stakeholders. 
These purposes and functions of labour law can thus be contrasted to those of 
company law, which will be addressed below. 
3.3 Company law perspectives and theories 
3.3.1 Theories and models of companies 
Modern corporate law162 has progressed significantly. The impact of globalisation has 
had an impact on how corporations conduct themselves when they do business. This 
is also the case in South Africa, where there was a need to rejuvenate the corporate 
law landscape to keep up with trends locally and internationally. The Constitution 
has had a fundamental impact on law in general, as it states that "[t]he Republic of 
South Africa is a sovereign, democratic state" founded on values such as human 
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms, as well as non-racialism, non-sexism and the supremacy of the 
constitution and the rule of law".163 In Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of South 
Africa: In Re Ex Parte President of the Republic of South Africa164 it was pointed out 
that "the Constitution is the supreme law, and all law, including the common law, 
derives its force from the Constitution and is subject to the constitutional control". It 
is clear that corporations should not only subscribe to the principles of the 
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constitution but that as legal persons they are also afforded rights such as dignity 
and privacy, for example.165 
Recently the South African company law landscape underwent a dramatic overhaul 
with the introduction of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. Developments in corporate 
governance jurisprudence have taken place not only in South Africa but worldwide in 
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. The 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 was repealed by the 2008 Act. Central to company law is 
the promotion of corporate governance. The 1973 Act, however, did not deal with 
matters of corporate governance. Developments in corporate governance 
jurisprudence in South Africa have seen the publication of the King I Report in 
1994166 and the King II Report in 2002.167 Due to changes in international 
governance trends and the need to reform South African company law, the King III 
Report saw the light. This paved the way for the highly anticipated Companies Act, 
which was a product of the Department of Trade and Industry's (the DTI's) policy 
paper,168 which envisaged the development of a "clear, facilitating, predictable and 
constantly enforced governing law".169 Corporate governance matters were dealt 
with exclusively as voluntary codes by King I and its successor King II.170 The 2008 
Act "not only sets out how a company acquires legal personality and raises funds, 
but incorporates issues of corporate governance for the first time since the limited 
liability company was introduced in South Africa by the Joint Stock Companies 
Limited Liability Act 23 of 1861 in the Cape".171 Companies must now apply a triple 
bottom-line approach by taking due cognisance not only of the economic 
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implications of their actions but also the social and environmental implications.172 
Before we look at what is covered under corporate law and corporate law principles 
it is important to look at exactly what corporate governance entails. 
Corporate governance is a broad concept, and there is no general and universally 
accepted definition thereof.173 The concept is "ambiguous" and "depends on the 
historical and cultural background of the country defining it."174 It deals not only with 
the common-law and statutory duties of directors175 but also includes structures and 
processes that deal with control, management and decision-making in 
organisations.176 Corporate governance can also be said to be "the whole set of 
legal, cultural, and institutional arrangements that determine what publicly traded 
corporations can do, who controls them, how that control is exercised, and how the 
risks and returns from the activities they undertake are allocated".177 Another useful 
definition of corporate governance that is proposed is as follows: 
The system of regulating and overseeing corporate conduct and of balancing the 
interests of all stakeholders and other parties (external stakeholders, governments 
and local communities) who can be affected by the corporation's conduct, in order 
to ensure responsible behaviour by corporations and to achieve the maximum level 
of efficiency and profitability for a corporation.
178
 
Taking note of the role of companies in the promotion of corporate governance, it is 
important to revert to exactly what constitutes a company. A company179 is a juristic 
person that exists separately from its management and shareholders. A company (or 
corporation) has broader existence than in a simply legal context, as it also has 
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political, sociological and economic aspects.180 The "separateness" of a company 
forms one of the foundations of company law, because several consequences flow 
from it - such as the limited liability of shareholders; the fact that the company can 
sue and be sued in its own name; the fact that the property, profits, debts and 
liabilities of the company belong to it and not the shareholders; etcetera.181 Although 
shareholder primacy seems to be the underlying theme when it comes to the 
beneficiaries of wealth creation, in company law other stakeholders have also 
become important. The question "to whom does the corporation account?"182 is an 
important one to ask. 
It must be noted that the basic legal characteristics/attributes of the business 
corporation must be identifiable in order to determine what the function(s) of 
corporate law entail. These characteristics are those of legal personality, limited 
liability, transferable shares, delegated management under a board structure, and 
investor ownership,183 and must "respond … to the economic exigencies of the large 
modern business enterprise".184 Corporate law must out of necessity provide for 
these features. From this it is clear that two important functions of corporate law can 
be identified: the principal function of corporate law is to provide business 
enterprises with a legal form/structure that possesses these five core 
characteristics/attributes, whereas the second function reduces the on-going costs of 
organising business through the corporate form.185 The latter outcome is achieved 
by facilitating coordination between the participants in the corporate enterprise, and 
by reducing the scope for value-reducing forms of opportunism among the different 
constituencies,186 such as conflicts between managers and shareholders, conflicts 
among shareholders, and conflicts between shareholders and the corporation's other 
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constituencies, including creditors and employees.187 These generic conflicts are 
usually characterised by economists as "agency problems".188 
Commentators have developed many theories and models in order to determine the 
nature of a company.189 It is therefore important to note that companies play an 
important role in the creation of wealth in societies and nations. This is a universal 
truth. Millions of people are dependent on the income they receive from corporations 
in the form of wages (salaries). Their livelihoods depend upon these wages because 
in most instances it is their only source of income. This dependency on wages has 
resulted in society becoming a generation of "wage earners". It is therefore 
important for society as a whole and not just for corporations and their shareholders 
that wealth creation takes place in a continuous and sustainable manner. In this 
context corporate accountability plays a very important role. According to Bone,190 
corporate accountability "defines who is a recognized stakeholder, and what 
substantive legal rights stakeholders have in relation to the board of directors". 
Corporate accountability is modern civil society's response to impeding social and 
environmental impacts from corporate power.191 It is therefore important to look at 
the different theories on the nature of a company. Three theories that can be 
identified are the contractual, communitarian and concessionary theories. 
3.3.1.1 Contractual theory 
According to the contractual theory two or more parties come together and come to 
an agreement with regards to the commercial activity they want to get involved 
in.192 The company is born from this pact between the various contracting parties 
and the "interests of the company" are limited to the interest of the contractors.193 
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This theory stipulates that various operational contracts exist between various 
corporate constituents and that the corporation is not accountable except to 
shareholders and any other constituent it has a contract with.194 The company is 
seen as a "nexus of contracts, with a series of ongoing negotiations between 
management, shareholders, employees and the various corporate constituents".195 
The creation of the corporation is seen as a right, and the corporate constitution is a 
contract between the shareholders and the directors of the corporation, which 
recognises the shareholders as corporate owners who delegate authority to the 
directors of the corporation. The directors hold in theory the corporate property in 
trust and thus the managers' act as trustees or agents in accordance with their 
fiduciary obligation.196 The supremacy of the shareholder is upheld by this theory. 
Some variants of this theory include shareholder primacy, stakeholder theory and 
the team production model.197 
3.3.1.2 Communitarian theory 
In terms of the communitarian theory the company is granted the status of an 
instrument of the state itself and not merely a concession of the state.198 Corporate 
obligation, according to this theory, is extended to include shareholders, creditors, 
labour, suppliers, customers and the public, as well as the environment. The 
company is regarded as a community of constituencies where directors owe duties 
to all these stakeholders and not only to the shareholders as the dominant 
constituency.199 It is based on political rather than an economic theory.200 Two 
consequences stem from this theory. Firstly, the company does not have a strong 
commercial identity, even though the company might have a strong social 
responsibility and secondly, the corporate veil will be more or less non-existent as 
the state uses the corporate tool merely to further its ends.201 Communitarian theory 
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is needed "to make the best society we can aspire towards, and give individuals a 
richer sense of identity and self".202 Corporate obligations should include ethical 
aspects that enhance and protect the welfare of all corporate constituents and thus 
embrace the corporate social responsibility ideals.203 This theory is the leading 
example of corporate theory. Corporate theory acknowledges the public role of 
corporations, as opposed thinking a corporation to be a mere nexus of private 
contracts, and thus corporations are seen as individuals that are created by law with 
certain rights and obligations.204 At the heart of the communitarian theory is the 
belief that "there is a role for public regulation of corporations to ensure that the 
public trust is not abused by corporate power". Corporate influence should therefore 
be used in the broad public interest.205 
3.3.1.3 Concession theory 
The concession theory has two branches:206 firstly, the company is viewed as a 
concession by the state, which provides it with the ability to trade as a 
corporation.207 This is especially the case where limited liability is afforded.208 The 
state has the power to revoke corporate powers because the company was afforded 
limited liability by the state and because the concession of authority could be 
legitimised only through a public purpose.209 The difference between the 
communitarian and concession theories is that the latter "accept[s] that the state 
has a limited role to play in ensuring that corporate governance structures are fair 
and democratic, but do[es] not force the company to realign its aims to reflect the 
social aspirations of the state".210 According to Dine, the concession theory "does not 
give a clear signal as to the 'interests of the company' although it may remove some 
of the more extreme emphasis on the interests of the founders and thus be 
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responsible for a more equitable mix of interests".211 The state is thus encouraged to 
interfere with the corporate veil because the company is essentially a creation of the 
state, particularly where the public interest is to be at stake.212 The second branch is 
the "bottom-up concessionary theory".213 In terms of this branch the company is an 
extension of the contracting parties' or partners' original agreement. It seeks to 
show that the contracting parties have created an instrument, which has a real 
identity that is separate and quite distinct from the original contracting parties. This 
is done when they come together and make use of the corporate tool to create the 
company. The company stands free from its founders and becomes a separate 
person with its own interests.214 It also enables the use of a constituency model, 
because the interests of the company are no longer limited to those of the 
contracting party but are extended to include its employees, creditors and 
customers.215 These parties will join the original contracting parties as part of the 
commercial concern. The concession model provides for the constituencies, but is 
limited in the fact that it does not provide for an explanation of "how to balance the 
competing interests and arrive at the interests of the company as a whole".216 
Those models relevant to employee participation in decision-making are now 
considered. 
3.3.2 Overview of shareholder and stakeholder models 
Before the enactment of the Companies Act little attention was given in legislation 
other than labour legislation to the voice of employees. It has been said that in order 
to enhance the position of employees within the field of corporate law various 
avenues must be pursued. These avenues, generally speaking, should firstly "seek to 
ensure that corporations pay attention to the interests of their employees, 
communicate with them (particularly on day-to-day issues that concern them) and 
act in ways that sustain and enhance their reasonable expectations", and secondly 
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should involve "attempts to provide employees with positions of influence in terms of 
corporate decisions that affect them and thus accord[s] them a role in corporate 
decision-making".217 
Quite a number of models stemmed from the theories discussed above. The 
development and recognition of stakeholder models as alternatives to the 
shareholder primacy models will now be discussed. 
3.3.2.1 Shareholder primacy model 
The shareholder primacy model (also known as the contractual model) deems the 
interests of shareholders to be the only consideration on which management of the 
company should act, because they are required to act "in the best interests of the 
company".218 The goal of the corporation is to maximise shareholders' wealth, and 
by doing so also to benefit society.219 This model is unconcerned with the interests 
of creditors and employees because the company is the sole property and concern of 
the contracting parties.220 
3.3.2.2 Stakeholder theories 
The stakeholder model of company law (also known as the constituency model) 
considers other interested parties in the decision making of the directors. Other 
stakeholders that should be considered include the employees, consumers, the 
general public, and the environment. Because the stakeholder theory specifically 
includes shareholders, creditors and other groups who contribute towards corporate 
profitability, it acknowledges "a moral obligation" to these stakeholders in the form 
of a "social contract".221 The social contract "reduces the corporation to an entity of 
relations between corporate constituents" and the corporation can be seen as "a 
nexus of associations that imports stakeholder rights and social obligations under the 
banner of a business enterprise".222 In the light of this, it is submitted that the 
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existence of a "new concept of a company" must be acknowledged. This new 
concept has been expressed in the following terms: 
There was a time when business success in the interests of shareholders was 
thought to be in conflict with society's aspirations for people who work in the 
company or in supply chain companies, for the long-term well-being of the 
community and for the protection of the environment. The law is now based on a 
new approach. Pursuing the interests of shareholders and embracing wider 
responsibilities are complementary purposes, not contradictory ones.223 
A strong basis for this model is the "bottom-up" concessionary theory (discussed 
above). Two variants can be identified: the first variant sees the company run in the 
interests of shareholders assumes that it is the interests of shareholders to take 
account of other interest groups, because to ignore them would damage the 
interests of shareholders.224 Legislation creates and details the interests that must be 
considered when directors exercise their duties, but enforcement is left in the hands 
of the shareholders.225 This theory is very closely related to the so-called 
"enlightened shareholder value"226 approach, which provides for the maximal 
protection of shareholders but also considers other stakeholders. The interests of 
these stakeholders are, however, subordinate to those of shareholders, and in the 
end profit-maximisation is the main goal of the directors. Shareholder interests still 
retain primacy and the interests of other stakeholders are therefore considered only 
insofar as they would promote the interests of shareholders.227 
In terms of the second variant "the company is seen as encompassing interests 
other than those of the shareholders" and the "interests of the company" are seen to 
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include at least shareholders, employees and creditors.228 The directors should 
consider all constituents of the corporation.229 The directors thus have direct 
fiduciary duties to the different stakeholders of the company. This is called the 
school of "pluralism".230 It asserts that "co-operative and productive relationships will 
only be optimised where directors are permitted (or required) to balance 
shareholders' interests with those of others committed to the company".231 This 
approach directly benefits the "company as a whole".232 This inclusive approach is in 
line with King I, II and III. The theory recognises that a company is represented by 
the interests of shareholders, employees and creditors, and directors "should act in 
the best interests of the company as a separate legal entity" because an interest 
that "may be paramount at one point in time in a company's existence" may become 
secondary at a later stage.233 As noted earlier, an important question in company 
law still today is in whose interest the company should be managed. One view is 
that a company can be best described as "a series of contracts concluded by self-
interested economic actors".234 These actors include equity investors (shareholders), 
managers, employees235 and creditors. When these contracts are taken together 
they make up the structure of the company and when these contracts are evaluated 
the contracts with the shareholders hold sway and the company ultimately operates 
to serve their interests.236 According to this view it is also clear that these 
shareholders expect the company to be profitable and that the company's directors 
and managers are tasked primarily with the duty of creating corporate governance 
structures "which ensure[s] that the company conducts its business so as to 
maximise the returns of these investors".237 Viewed differently, it can thus be said 
that a corporation "cannot be reduced to the sum of a series of contracts" because it 
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is vital to take into account a wide range of stakeholders, whose interests may 
overlap or be in conflict with one another.238 It is thus important to note when 
applying corporate governance principles that "the board and management of 
corporations strike a balance between the interests of their various stakeholders".239 
It is necessary for any corporation to determine which groups will be regarded as 
"stakeholders". Different weights need to be attached to the interests represented in 
a company and thus the interests of some groups of people connected with the 
corporation must be weighed at the various stages of the company's existence.240 
Directors should be aware of the interests of various stakeholders afforded to them 
by legislation, in order to properly balance the interests of stakeholders.241 The 
interests of employees as stakeholders of the company may, for example, receive 
preference over those of shareholders collectively.242 In this regard Davies243 posts 
an important question: are there any good arguments for privileging employees over 
other stakeholders in the company in respect to corporate governance: suppliers, 
customers, creditors, for example? Davies244 then addresses this dilemma as follows: 
Although stakeholder theories of corporate governance appear to give the case for 
worker representation a way of breaking down the supremacy of shareholders, in 
some ways stakeholder theories go too far from the point of view of employee 
representation. Stakeholding, at least in the economic form of the argument, 
suggests that governance protections are needed for all those who make firm 
specific investments against the expropriation of which by the controllers of the firm 
contractual protections are ineffective. Employees may be the paradigm example of 
such a group, but they are not the only example ... Modern stakeholding theories 
have thus generated a problem for labor lawyers, which, it seems to me, they have 
not yet squarely addressed. Talk of 'the two sides of industry' or of 'labour and 
capital' or, even 'the social partners' does not fit well within the pluralism of 
stakeholding, which embraces all those contracting with the company who cannot 
specify in advance a complete set of contractual terms to govern their relationship. 
It may be possible to distinguish workers from other stakeholders, not on the basis 
that other stakeholders can effectively rely on other bodies of law, insolvency law 
or commercial law, for example, to protect them. However, it is a matter for further 
analysis whether insolvency and commercial law contain effective mechanisms, 
which labor law lacks and cannot develop. 
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As indicated earlier one of the underlying philosophies of King III is that companies 
should be regarded as good corporate citizens if they subscribe to the sustainability 
considerations that are rooted in the Constitution. This assessment of worth also 
entails that they should adhere to the basic social contract which they have entered 
into as South Africans, and their responsibilities to promote the realisation of human 
rights.245 This social contract implies some form of altruistic behaviour, which in 
essence is "the converse of selfishness", whereas self-interest connotes 
selfishness.246 The Companies Act, in its purpose provision, inter alia commits to 
promoting compliance with the Bill of Rights in the application of company law as 
well as the development of the South African economy, by "encouraging 
transparency and high standards of corporate governance".247 These principles are 
further enhanced by the fact that the Act acknowledges the significant role of 
enterprises within the social and economic life of the nation,248 aims to balance the 
"rights and obligations of shareholders and directors"249 within companies, and 
encourages the efficient and responsible management of companies.250 
It has been argued that the traditionalist view of company law based on notions that 
"corporations are voluntary, private, contractual entities, that they have broad 
powers to make money in whatever way and in whichever locations they see fit"251 
and that management has an obligation to its shareholders and shareholders alone, 
is quite narrow and out-dated. It is suggested that a new set of principles and 
policies for corporate law should be developed.  
These principles are as follows:252 
(a) The ultimate purpose of corporations should be to serve the interests of 
society as a whole253 
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A company cannot be considered to be successful if the "total social value it creates 
is less than the social costs it throws off".254 If the interests of society as a whole 
matter more than the profit of the company, then profit cannot be the only 
indication of its success, as the cost side of the equation is also important.255 This is 
regarded as the foundational principle, and not shareholder primacy (which is 
regarded as one of the potential conclusions). The way in which the success of 
corporations is measured should also change in order to determine if the best 
interests of society as a whole have been served.256 The financial reports of 
companies should not be the only tool for measurement, as they tend, for example, 
not to take into account externalities such as the value of the company to its 
workers or to the communities in which it does business or the environmental costs 
of the company's products or services (other than the costs relevant to the 
shareholders).257 These reports also do not take human rights violations into 
consideration. This information is important not only to general citizens but also to 
decision-makers. If society requires corporations to be more accountable, a broader 
view should be taken of their responsibilities, and the focus should not be only on 
shareholders' returns.258 The sustainability of the company is another issue that 
needs to be considered, as the ability of the business to survive over time is 
important not only to the company but also to society at large.259 Companies should 
for example not only maintain safe and healthy work environments but should 
extend this requirement in order to survive over time. It can thus be said that a 
corporation "creating wealth for society" must sustain itself.260 
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(b) Corporations are distinctly able to contribute to the societal good by creating 
financial prosperity261 
The transferability of shares, limited liability, specialised and centralised 
management, and perpetual existence as creations of law are but a number of the 
characteristics that distinguish modern public corporations from other kinds of 
businesses.262 Society establishes not only the framework of corporate law within 
which these corporations create wealth in the economy. Even when society acts 
collectively, decisions are often made that put other values ahead of wealth.263 For 
example, we strive to end racial injustice even though it will "cost" us in terms of 
financial health, or we prohibit companies from discriminating against potential 
employees on the basis of their disability even if such accommodation of disability is 
costly.264 It thus follows that "[w]e collectively value justice, fairness, equality, and 
human rights265 even though it 'costs' money and resources to protect them".266 
(c) Corporate law should further principles one and two267 
The concept is that law is necessary to ensure that corporations serve the interests 
of society (principle one) and create wealth (principle two).268 Agreement should 
thus be reached on the fact that corporations should be measured on how they 
advance the interests of society as well as the fact that corporations have a 
comparative advantage in building wealth for all of their stakeholders. If corporate 
law reinforces these principles, the question becomes "how specifically corporate 
governance might advance these goals".269 
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(d) A corporation's wealth should be shared fairly among those who contribute to 
its creation270 
To explain this principle we must commence with the non-controversial idea that 
corporations are collective enterprises:271 
Corporations require a multitude of inputs, all of which are essential. The firm 
needs financial capital, which they get from equity investors, debt creditors, 
consumers who pay money for the firm's goods and services, and sometimes from 
government. The firm depends on labour, which they get from salaried employees, 
hourly-wage workers, and independent contractors. The firm depends on 
infrastructure, which comes from governments of various stripes. Finally, the firm 
depends on a social fabric of laws and norms that create and sustain the 
marketplace and enable a stable society in which the company can operate. The 
notion that corporations depend on multiple stakeholders is implicit in most theories 
of the firm and is not particularly contentious. The difficulty, of course is what to do 
with that insight. 
The mainstream view of what to do with the insight is nothing; the shareholder is 
supreme and should be the sole beneficiary of the management's fiduciary duties. 
The management's sole obligation within corporate law is to serve the shareholder, 
usually by maximizing the share price. The others that contribute to the firm protect 
themselves through contract or government regulation. The management has no 
obligations to these additional stakeholders other than those that arise from their 
market power, from contractual commitments, or from some non-corporate source 
of law. 
Once we take Principle One to heart, however, this fixation on shareholder gain is 
revealed as a mistake. It is not based on a shareholder 'right' to the exclusive 
attention of the management, and it is unlikely to further the interests of society as 
whole. Rather, the real reason for shareholder primacy in corporate law has to do 
with the primacy of shareholders in the market. Capital is much more mobile than 
labour or infrastructure, so it can extract in the corporate 'contract' the right to be 
the sole beneficiary of management's fiduciary duties. This does not settle, of 
course, the normative argument. The market is a creature of law, and law can 
certainly constrain it. The law need not mimic the market's power hierarchy. 
Indeed, if the purpose of corporate law is to serve society as a whole, the law 
emphatically should not mimic the market.
272
 
It thus follows that fairness plays an important role in society due to the fact that 
society is not exclusively concerned with the maximisation of aggregate wealth but 
also with the equability of its distribution.273 Economic justice is mostly ignored in 
mainstream corporate law due to the fact that when "people use bargained-for 
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exchange to distribute goods, the weaker bargainer will be less able to extract 
concessions from the other".274 Even if the less-well-off party is marginally better off, 
the more powerful party to the contract will tend to be much better off, so unless 
there is "some explicit constraint on the ability of corporations to pass along the 
lion's share or profit to shareholders, the nation's inequality will worsen over 
time".275 Corporate law, it appears, is very suited to and an efficient means to 
promote fairness, and to redistribute wealth and income, rather than other areas of 
regulation.276 A stakeholder-oriented corporate law "would work at the initial 
distribution of the corporate surplus and would benefit stakeholders up and down 
the economic hierarchy".277 This thus implies that when we take fairness seriously as 
a value, a corporate law framework that doesn't promote fairness could not be 
blindly accepted.278 
(e) Participatory, democratic corporate governance is the best way to ensure the 
sustainable creation and equitable distribution of corporate wealth279 
The fair allocation of the corporate surplus (as discussed under principle four above) 
"is essential to sustaining socially-beneficial corporations over time, but allocative 
decisions are extremely difficult, especially ex ante".280 It appears that corporate 
governance should instead focus on procedural fairness (rather than trying to reach 
agreement ex ante about substantive fairness), as its crucial objective is "to create 
methods of decision-making"281 that offer procedural fairness among the various 
stakeholders. In order to make it a real possibility that a corporation serve its 
stakeholders by creating wealth in a sustainable way and then share the wealth in 
an equitable way, the management needs to be subjected to different constraints. 
The fiduciary duty of directors and management should thus be changed and should 
be owed to the firm as a whole, and it should empower stakeholders with some 
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enforcement mechanisms.282 This could be made possible, by empowering non-
shareholder stakeholders to bring civil action for a breach of duties of care, for 
example, or by providing for the election of their own representatives to the 
board.283 Or employees could elect a portion of the board.284 An example of the 
latter can be found in German co-determination, where half of the supervisory board 
of major companies consists of worker representatives.285 This composition calls 
upon the board to be "pluralistic", and could actually "retard those selfish impulses 
because any behaviour that benefits one stakeholder at the expense of the firm 
must be done in the view of the others" and the probable effect of such a 
broadening of the composition of the board could be that non-shareholder 
stakeholders could speak for other stakeholders so that they would in effect get a 
"larger share of the pie than they now get".286 If boards thus stand to benefit from 
"a greater openness and diversity", such "openness would not only make for better 
decision-making but likely fairer decision-making as well".287  
4 Conclusion 
From the discussion on the functions of labour law and the theories and models on 
the nature of companies, it is quite evident that labour law largely still provides for 
and applies a protective view when it comes to the advancement of employees' 
rights. It is also apparent that the managerial prerogative is still important in the 
sphere of both labour and company law, but that this prerogative is not absolute. 
This is judged to be the case because employees can restrict such a prerogative by 
acting in concert and making use of collective bargaining structures to prevent their 
exploitation by their employer. This does not, however, mean that the employer's 
prerogative has been lost. Employees are still obliged to work and act in good faith 
and the employer still has the right to direct and allocate the work in terms of this 
prerogative. 
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Industrial democracy has also provided employees with the tools to have a say in 
what goes on in the corporation so that they do not just have to accept demands 
made by the employer with regard to changes in conditions of employment, for 
example. Although labour law protects employees with regard to unilateral changes 
to their employment contracts, employers are still entitled to change work practices 
unilaterally. The managerial power of employers grants them this power. The 
collective bargaining process and consultation are valuable tools that grant 
employees the power to address inequality in the management-labour power 
struggle. Central to the collective bargaining process is the right to strike. If one 
views participation in decision-making as a continuum, one would find the disclosure 
of information and consultation on one end of that continuum whilst joint-decision-
making would be on the other end. The right to strike, it is submitted, would usually 
be utilised in order to achieve a form of participation that is higher on the 
continuum, where employees do not have a legal right as such to participate in 
decision making. The right to strike plays an important role in South Africa, not only 
because it is given the status of a fundamental rights in the Constitution but also in 
more practical terms because it provides employees with a powerful economic 
weapon in the collective bargaining process, especially when a deadlock is reached 
in the negotiation process with their employer. 
The changing role of companies as members of society cannot be overstated. 
Although corporate law traditionally focused on shareholder wealth creation, 
developments in corporate law and corporate governance jurisprudence clearly show 
that the belief in shareholder primacy is out-dated. Shareholders can no longer be 
treated as if they were the only stakeholders or even the most important 
stakeholders in companies. It is evident from the development of the different 
theories and models on companies that the shareholder primacy model is no longer 
the preferred (and appropriate) model. It is also evident from the pluralist approach 
that employees as stakeholders have an important role to play in advancing the 
interests of the company as a whole. This is also unmistakable from a reading of the 
various reports on corporate governance in South Africa as well as the Companies 
Act. Companies can no longer just make decisions without taking note of the 
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protection and rights granted to employees by other legislation, including the rights 
afforded to employees by the Companies Act itself. 
A question still remains about the extent and the level(s) at which employees should 
participate in corporate decision-making. This question will be analysed in 
subsequent contributions - by looking at the types of processes and norms already in 
place in labour and company law and by looking at other jurisdictions for guidance. 
What is clear is the fact that companies can no longer ignore employees and their 
voice on what goes on in the organisation.  
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